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CONTRACTS 
Kathleen E. Paynet 
INTRODUCTION 
Only a handful of cases decided during the survey period in-
volved contract issues. Of those cases, three appear worthy of re-
view. Two cases were decided under the Uniform Commercial Code 
involving (1) whether a repair or replacement limitation of remedy 
provision prevents a buyer from recovering the purchase price 
when a defective part reduces the entire unit to scrap; and (2) 
whether damages attributable to a recall campaign by the manu-
facturer of an end product are recoverable from a parts supplier as 
consequential damages. The third case involved an option contract 
for the purchase of real property and the availability of damages to 
the option holder when the option has not been exercised. 
I. REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT LIMITATIONS 
In Rudd Construction Equipment Company u. Clark Equip-
ment Company,l the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Ken-
tucky law2 in a diversity action to determine the damage recovery 
available to the buyer where a latently defective component de-
stroyed the entire unit five months after purchase. Rudd, a heavy 
equipment dealer and distributor, purchased a tractor shovel from 
the manufacturer, Clark, for $268,434. Mter less than 400 hours of 
demonstration use, the shovel caught fire, reducing the entire unit 
to scrap valued at $20,000. Evidence established that the fire was 
caused by a ruptured hydraulic hose and that the hose was defec-
tive at the time it was delivered.8 The sales agreement contained a 
limitation of remedy provision, limiting Clark's obligation to repair 
or replace any new part which proved defective within six months 
t J.D., Detroit College of Law, 1977; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1981; Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, Detroit College of Law. 
1. 735 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1984). 
2. Although the purchase agreement of the parties contained a choice of laws provision 
designating Michigan, the parties and the trial judge appear to have relied primarily on 
Kentucky law. The court of appeals followed suit. [d. at 978 n.1. 
3. [d. at 975. 
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after delivery or 1,000 hours of use.' Additionally, the agreement 
expressly negated any liability on the part of Clark for consequent-
ial or special damages resulting from a breach of warranty.G In 
light of these provisions, Clark maintained that Rudd should re-
cover only the replacement cost of the hose which ruptured.8 
The trial court determined that even though the ruptured hose 
was the only defective part, the buyer could still recover the 
purchase price plus freight expenses less the scrap value, under a 
breach of warranty theory.7 Alternatively, the trial court held that 
under strict liability and negligence theories, the buyer would also 
be entitled to its loss of profits on the resale of the tractor shovel.8 
Accordingly, the district court awarded a judgment for $315,945 
plus interest, the greater measure of recovery calculated on the 
tort theories. The court of appeals affirmed the award on the 
breach of warranty theory,9 revised the alternative award on the 
tort theories,IO and, therefore, remanded the case for a modifica-
tion of judgment as to the dollar damages awarded. 11 
Rudd is significant because it deals with the often troublesome 
questions of when a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose12 
and, what remedies are accorded the non-breaching party under 
such circumstances. Freedom of contract is a major principle of the 
V.C.C.,13 and thus remedies, like most contractual provisions, may 
be limited by agreement: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section 
and of the.preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages, 
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in 
substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or 
4. Id. at 976. 
5. Id. The agreement stated: "IN NO EVENT SHALL CLARK BE LIABLE FOR CON-
SEQUENTIAL OR SPECIAL DAMAGES." Id. 
6. Id. at 977. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 982. 
10. Id. at 985. 
11. The dollar figure in the judgment representing the tractor's value was to be reduced 
from $315,945, resale value less salvage, to $255,913.88, the wholesale value less salvage. Id. 
at 986. 
12. This question was raised in Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable and 
Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1983), reviewed in the last survey issue. See Payne, 
Contracts, Fifth Annual Survey of Sixth Circuit Law, 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 451, 456-63. 
13. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1977). 
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alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by 
limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment 
of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods 
or parts; and 
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy 
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole 
remedy." 
455 
Clark attempted to limit Rudd's remedy to repair or replace defec-
tive parts. III Since repairing or replacing was Clark's "sole obliga-
tion" under the warranty provision, Clark undoubtedly intended 
this remedy to be exclusive. Although not discussed in the case 
and, thus, probably not dealt with by the parties, some courts 
might find the language inadequate to create an exclusive rem-
edy.16 Such a finding would eliminate the necessity of establishing 
that the remedy failed of its essential purpose. Where a remedy 
provided for by agreement is optional rather than exclusive, the 
cumulative remedies of the U.C.C. are available to the aggrieved 
party. 17 
Nevertheless, even treating the repair or replacement limitation 
as exclusive, there are parameters on the parties' ability to limit 
14. U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (1977) (emphasis added). 
15. The sales agreement between Clark and Rudd provided: 
There are no warranties, expressed or implied, AND THERE IS NO IMPLIED 
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICU-
LAR PURPOSE, made by CLARK to DISTRIBUTOR on products or parts ex-
cept as follows: 
CLARK warrants each new part of the product manufactured by it to be free from 
defects in material and workmanship under normal use and maintenance. 
CLARK'S sole obligation under this warranty shall be limited to replacing or re-
pairing F.O.B. CLARK'S plant, or allowing credit for, at CLARK'S option, any 
new part which under normal and proper use and maintenance proves defective in 
material and workmanship within six (6) months after delivery to or one thousand 
(1,000) hours of use by the first ultimate user, whichever shall occur first; 
THIS WARRANTY IS IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES (EXCEPT 
OF TITLE), EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AND THERE ARE NO IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR OF FITNESS FOR A PARTIC-
ULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL CLARK BE LIABLE FOR CONSE-
QUENTIAL OR SPECIAL DAMAGES. 
735 F.2d at 976. 
16. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 463-65 (2d ed. 1980), for a discussion of Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 465 
S.W.2d 80 (1971). 
17. Remedies are presumed to be cumulative rather than exclusive. U.C.C. § 2-719 com-
ment 2 (1977). 
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remedies. Section 2-719(2) states one such limitation: "Where cir-
cumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its es-
sential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act."18 
The difficult question is to determine what is required for such a 
remedy to fail of its essential purpose. The U.C.C. Official Com-
ments (Comments) provide that "an apparently fair and reasona-
ble limitation clause" must give way to the general remedy provi-
sions of Article 2 when the clause "operates to deprive either party 
of the substantial value of the bargain."19 
The purpose of an exclusive remedy of replacement or repair of 
defective parts is to give the seller an opportunity to make the 
goods conform while limiting his risks by excluding potential direct 
and consequential damages. From the buyer's point of view, the 
purpose of the exclusive remedy is to give him goods that conform 
to the contract within a reasonable time after a defective part is 
discovered.20 
This rosy picture of the limited repair warranty, however, rests upon at 
least three assumptions: that the warrantor will diligently make repairs, 
that such repairs will indeed "cure" the defects, and that consequential 
loss in the interim will be negligible. So long as these assumptions hold 
true, the limited remedy appears to operate fairly. . . . But when one of 
these assumptions proves false in a particular case, the purchaser may 
find that the substantial benefit of the bargain has been 10st.2l 
Accordingly, in the great majority of cases where courts have held 
that limited remedies fail of their essential purpose, the seller is 
either unwilling or unable to conform the goods to the contract.22 
The instant case is atypical in that the seller was never afforded 
an opportunity to repair, since the defect resulted in the immedi-
ate destruction of the entire tractor shovel. On this basis, Clark 
18. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1977). 
19. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1977). 
20. Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973). 
21. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of 
U.C.C. Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28, 63 (1977). 
22. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert 
dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982). See, e.g., AES Technology Sys. Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 
583 F.2d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 1978) ("If after repeated efforts by a seller to place a product 
into warranted condition, and the seller cannot or will not do so, the remedy of repair or 
replacement may be deemed to have failed of its essential purpose. . .. tt). S.M. Wilson & 
Co. v. Smith Int'I Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he inability to cure substan-
tial defects does indicate that the repair remedy so failed."). 
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argued that only if there is an opportunity for the seller to repair 
and the seller fails to repair can the limited remedy be said to have 
failed of its essential purpose.23 Both the district court and the 
court of appeals rejected this reasoning. In reaching this result, the 
Sixth Circuit referred to Russo v. Hilltop Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. 24 
which also involved a repair or replacement clause and a latent de-
fect discovered simultaneously with the destruction of the goods. 
In Russo, a defective electrical system caused a fire which totally 
destroyed a new automobile. Oddly enough, the Missouri court 
found that the repair or replace limitation in the automobile war-
ranty had not failed of its essential purpose. Nevertheless, the 
court allowed the buyer to recover benefit of the bargain damages 
on the grounds that the limited warranty implied that the car was 
repairable.2Ci Commentators White and Summers consider the 
Russo case to be a classic failure of essential purpose case.26 In up-
holding the trial court's finding that Clark's limited remedy provi-
sion failed of its essential purpose, the Rudd court appears to have 
relied on the commentators' analysis of Russo.27 
23. 735 F.2d at 979-80 (referring to Clark's agreements on motion for reconsideration 
before the trial court). The case discusses "the limited warranty in the contract" and 
whether it can be said to have failed of its essential purpose. It should be noted that limited 
warranties do not fail of their essential purpose; limited remedies for breach of warranty 
may fail of their essential purpose. See the statutory language of U.C.C. § 2-316(4) and § 2-
719(2) (1977). 
24. 479 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). 
25. Id. at 213. 
26. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 469. 
Id. 
There are probably relatively few situations where a remedy can fail of its essen-
tial purpose. Section 2-719 (2) has been called into action most often in cases ... 
when the exclusive remedy involves replacement or repair of defective parts, and 
the seller because of his negligence in repair or because the goods are beyond re-
pair, is unable to put the goods in warranted condition. Section 2-719(2) might 
also apply when the exclusive remedy requires performance of an act by the buyer 
that is precluded by the seller's breach. For example, suppose an automobile man-
ufacturer limits remedy to repair and replacement of defective parts if such parts 
are delivered to its plant. If the entire car is destroyed as a result of defective 
wiring, the buyer would be unable to return the wiring to the manufacturer's 
plant. Even if the buyer could return the defective parts, repair or replacement 
would not restore the car to working condition. The exclusive remedy would there-
fore fail of its essential purpose. 
27. 735 F.2d at 982. After quoting the White & Summers text, supra note 26, the court 
of appeals concluded that "although none of the cited cases is precisely on point," the con-
struction of the Code adopted by the trial court is more reasonable than the construction 
urged by Clark. Id. 
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After detailed analysis of the failure of essential purpose issue, 
the court of appeals summarily dismissed a need for analysis of the 
second and more difficult question: the damage remedy available 
to Rudd. More specifically, the court failed to address whether re-
placement value of the tractor constitutes consequential damages, 
rather than direct damages, which were expressly excluded in the 
purchase agreement.28 
There is a split of authority as to whether an exclusion of conse-
quential damages clause may be given effect where a limited rem-
edy provision has failed of its essential purpose.29 One view prohib-
its application of the exclusionary clause.3o Another view, probably 
the majority position today, enforces the exclusion of consequent-
ial damages and limitation of remedy clauses independently, up-
holding the exclusionary clause unless to do so would be uncon-
scionable.31 Recently, in Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, 
Vegetable and Cold Storage CO.32 the Sixth Circuit adopted the 
latter view. Thus, the Lewis court held that absent a finding of 
unconscionability, the exclusion of consequential damages provi-
sion survived.33 Although Lewis was decided under Washington 
state law, the Kentucky provision is virtually identical with regard 
to limitation or exclusion of consequential damages in commercial 
settings.3• Accordingly, if the Sixth Circuit had addressed the spe-
28. After indicating that commentators White and Summers would classify most of the 
fire damage to the tractor shovel as consequential, the court summarily upheld the trial 
court's award of the net replacement value of the shovel. The court stated: 
The trial judge did not analyze his award of the net replacement value in terms of 
whether it was for "direct" or "consequential" damage. Nonetheless, his analysis 
of Kentucky case law makes it clear that regardless of how the fire damage is 
characterized, to the extent that express limitations in the contract precluded the 
owner in these circumstances from recovering at least the purchase price of the 
truck, such limitations were ineffective under Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.2-719(2). 
735 F.2d at 982. This conclusion appears inconsistent with the Lewis rationale discussed 
infra in the text. 
29. See generally Eddy, supra note 21. 
30. See, e.g., Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Morris v. Chevrolet Motor Div. of General Motors Corp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 
917, 114 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1974). 
31. Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 919 (1980); Lincoln Pulp & 
Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262 (D. Me. 1977); Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's 
Foods 256 Ark. 584, 510 S.W.2d 555 (1974). 
32. See supra note 12. 
33. 709 F.2d at 435. 
34. The Washington statute is non-uniform and contains special provisions covering lim-
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cific question in the instant case it probably would have followed 
the lead of Lewis and prevented Rudd's recovery of consequential 
damages. 
Due to the exclusion of consequential damage, the difficult ques-
tion in a case where a latent defect in a part results in the total 
destruction of the unit is whether the damage suffered by the unit 
may be classified as direct or general damages under section 2-
714.3C1 The court of appeals, quoting commentators White and 
Summers, stated: "Whenever a defective component part causes an 
accident that damages the entire product, a large part of the total 
damages may be consequential."3B Such a conclusion appears logi-
cal in light of the V.C.C. definition of consequential damages in-
cluding "injury to . . . property proximately resulting from any 
breach of warranty."37 The direct remedy provision appears consis-
tent by providing that "[t]he measure of damages for breach of 
warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance be-
tween the value of the goods accepted and the value they would 
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circum-
stances show proximate damages of a different amount."38 Since 
the usual standard of damages is measured at the time of accept-
ance-a time at which the defect has not rendered the unit worth-
less-the damage award would be limited to the cost of the defec-
tive part. The subsequent damage to the entire unit would be 
labeled consequential.39 Nonetheless, in the instant case the court 
itation of remedy provisions and consumer goods. See WASH. REV. CODE § 62 A 2-719(3) 
(1974). 
35. U.C.C. § 2-714 (1977) providing for buyer's damages in regard to accepted goods 
states: 
[d. 
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification [of breach) he 
may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting in the 
ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any manner 
. which is reasonable. 
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time 
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value 
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
• show proximate damages of a different amount. 
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next 
section may also be recovered. 
36. 735 F.2d at 982 (quoting WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 387 n.54). 
37. U.C.C. § 2·715(2)(b) (1977). 
38. U.C.C. § 2·714(2), see supra note 35 for provision's text. 
39. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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upheld the trial court's award of net replacement value whether for 
"direct" or "consequential" damage.4o 
This holding is misleading. The trial court relied on the Ken-
tucky case of Cox Motor Car Company v. Castle." Under that case 
when a machine bursts into flames the entire unit is one big defec-
tive part. Applying the general damage provision of section 2-
714(2), the value of the goods accepted in such a case is nothing or 
scrap value. Thus, in Cox the Kentucky court allowed as the mea-
sure of damages the "cost of replacing the truck with one not de-
fective, which would be the same as the difference in market 
value."4z Labeling the damages in the instant case as direct dam-
ages through reliance on the Cox case would be less misleading and 
troublesome. Alternatively, the court could have looked to the 
"special circumstance" clause of section 2-714(2) and modeled a 
different standard for measuring damages in latent defect cases. 
While the standard breach of warranty formula may be the usual, 
reasonable method of ascertaining the damages, it is not intended 
as an exclusive measure.43 
Finally, the Rudd court found it unnecessary to resolve the diffi-
cult question of whether a commercial buyer may recover damages 
in tort from the seller if the only injury is to the good which was 
the subject of the sales contract. The court avoided this issue by 
revising the trial court's conclusion that a tort recovery entitled 
Rudd to a larger damage award.44 However, it does appear that if 
the court of appeals had addressed the controversial issue, Ken-
tucky case law resolves it in favor of Rudd, permitting the tort re-
covery even though both of the parties were commercial entities.411 
II. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
In Taylor & Gaskin, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries,46 the court 
of appeals examined whether the damages attributable to a manu-
facturer's recall campaign of an end product are recoverable from a 
-' 
40. See supra note 28. 
41. 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1966). 
42. [d. at 431. 
43. 735 F.2d at 983. 
44. [d. 
45. See, e.g., C.D. Herme, Inc. v. R.C. Tway Co., 294 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1956); C & S Fuel, 
Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 524 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Ky. 1981). 
46. 732 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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parts supplier as consequential damages. Factually, Chris-Craft, a 
manufacturer of pleasure boats, developed plans for a new model 
called the MXA-25. Unlike predecessor boats, the new model was 
to have the fuel tank located at the stern of the craft and attached 
to the lining of the boat. 
Chris-Craft, as the buyer, entered into negotiations with Taylor 
& Gaskin, the seller, to obtain fuel tanks for the MXA-25. Seller 
quoted a price for hot-dipped galvanized tanks47 and buyer in-
quired whether it was possible to reduce the cost of the tanks. The 
seller indicated that ten dollars per tank could be saved by using a 
slush compound tank.48 This type of tank, as opposed to the hot 
galvanized tanks previously used by Chris-Craft, had a painted 
exterior. 
Seller offered to produce the slush compound tanks covering 
them with one coat of enamel paint 1.5 mils. thick. Seller knew the 
tanks would be exposed to the marine environment, but was una-
ware of the buyer's intended placement of the tanks.49 The seller, 
however, was aware that these slush compound tanks would not be 
able to resist corrosion.llo This fact was not communicated to the 
buyer. 
Buyer ordered 550 slush compound tanks and began installing 
them in the MXA-25 boats. In April of 1974, buyer began receiving 
numerous complaints regarding corrosion of the tanks. Buyer noti-
fied seller and suggested that the two institute a joint recall cam-
paign. Seller refused to participate in the recall, contending that 
the responsibility was on the buyer, Chris-Craft. III Buyer con-
ducted an investigation of the fuel tank problems and concluded 
that the corrosion problems were due to the breakdown of the 
tanks' exterior paint. In March of 1975, buyer initiated a voluntary 
recall of the tanks. 112 
47. Hot-dipped galvanized tanks were routinely used by Chris-Craft for gasoline tanks. 





52. Id. at 1276. The recall was not completely voluntary. The Federal Boat Safety Act of 
1971 provides that: 
Every manufacturer who discovers or acquires information which he determines 
in the exercise of reasonable and prudent judgment, indicates that a boat or asso-
ciated equipment ... contains a defect which creates a substantial risk of per-
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Three months later, the seller filed suit to obtain the balance of 
buyer's payments due on the tanks.&3 Buyer counterclaimed alleg-
ing negligence and breach of warranties. The district court found 
that the seller had breached the implied warranty of 
merchantability.&4 The court awarded the buyer the difference be-
tween the value of the tanks at the time they left the manufacturer 
and the value of the tanks had they been as warranted. && This 
amount was offset by the unpaid balance owed the seller. Despite 
the breach of warranty, the district court refused to award to the 
sonal injury to the public shall, if such boat or associated equipment has left the 
place of manufacture, furnish notification of such defect [.] ... The notification 
. . . shall contain a clear description of such defect ... , an evaluation of the 
hazard reasonably related thereto, a ststement of the measures to be taken to 
correct such defect . . . , and an undertaking by the manufacturer to take such 
measure at his sole cost and expense. 
46 U.S.C. §§ 1451, 1464 (1983). 
53. Filing a law suit to recover the balance due when the seller knows the goods are 
defective is risky at best. Such action is an invitation to counterclaim for direct and conse-
quential damages. Nevertheless, Chris-Craft might have initiated litigation with the same 
result. 
54. 732 F.2d at 1276. The statutory provision covering such warranties can be found in 
U.C.C. 2-314 (1977), which provides: 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall 
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant 
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food 
or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the 
description; and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, 
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may 
require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or 
label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may 
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade. 
U.C.C. 2-314 (1977). 
55. The district court apparently applied U.C.C. § 2-714(2), dealing with buyer's dam-
ages in a breach of warranty action, which provides: "[T]he measure of damages for breach 
of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the 
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless 
special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount." [d. The court found 
that the tanks had no value and awarded the buyer the contract price less the stipulated 
unpaid balance. 
HeinOnline -- 1985 Det. C.L. Rev. 463 1985
1985] Contracts 463 
buyer the recall expenditures as consequential damages. According 
to the court, the buyer had failed to perform corrosion tests, the 
rusting was also attributable to faulty installation, the removal and 
replacement of the tanks was not proximately caused by the 
breach, and the expenses of a recall campaign were not within the 
reasonable contemplation of the parties.08 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the 
issue presented was "the foreseeability of Taylor & Gaskin's 
knowledge at the time of contracting that a breach of warranty as 
to the merchantability of the tanks would result in a recall."07 The 
court summarily disposed in a brief footnote of the issue of Chris-
Craft's duty to mitigate°8 and held that the buyer was entitled to 
consequential damages representing the recall expenditures. The 
case was remanded for a determination of the amount.OS The con-
currence focused on the duty to mitigate, noting that the buyer 
should not be entitled to recover, as consequential damages, those 
recall expenses which were occasioned by the buyer's own negli-
gence or fault.80 As the concurrence noted, the trial court found as 
a matter of fact that the rusting was caused not only by the slush 
compound painting technique, but also by faulty installation, the 
design of the support shocks, and the location of the tank on the 
boats. All of these factors were attributable to Chris-Craft and 
contributed to the need for a recall campaign. 
The court of appeals majority avoided two major considerations 
in deciding the instant case.81 First, as pointed out by the concur-
rence, the court failed to examine the buyer's duty to mitigate the 
consequential damages. Secondly, the court did not address the 
56. 732 F.2d at 1277. Based upon these factors the trial court concluded that this was 
not a proper case for the imposition of consequential damages attendant to a recall. U.C.C. § 
2-714(3) (1977). 
57. 732 F.2d at 1278. 
58. Of course, the recovery of consequential damages is permissible only to the extent 
that damages "could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise." MICH. COMPo LAWS 
§ 440.2715(2)(a) (1970), U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1977). Herein, the district court's finding, that 
Chris-Craft conducted a reasonable inspection of the fuel tanks and that the failure to test 
the slush compound tanks to determine the corrosion resistance of the units was not blame-
worthy, precluded any determination that Chris-Craft could reasonably have prevented its 
consequential damages. See Michigan Sugar Co. v. Jebary Sorenson Orchard Co. 66 Mich. 
App. 642, 646, 239 N.W.2d 693, 695-96 (1976). Id. at 1278, n.2. 
59. 732 F.2d at 1279. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1280. 
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question of whether the consequential damages of a recall cam-
paign should be awarded where the seller's liability would be vastly 
disproportionate to the purchase price of the goods. 
The D.C.C. has adopted the reasonable foreseeability test of 
Hadley v. Baxendale,62 for determining whether a seller should be 
liable for the consequential damages suffered by the buyer.63 Sec-
tion 2-715(2)(a) provides that a defendant is liable for "any loss 
resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of 
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know 
. . . . "64 This objective test has been adopted by the vast majority 
of jurisdictions, and is consistent with Professor Corbin's view: 
All that is necessary, in order to charge the defendant with the particular 
loss, is that it is one that ordinary follows the breach of such a contract 
in the usual course of events, or that reasonable men in the position of 
the parties would have foreseen as a probable result of breach.6G 
Although the D.C.C. has adopted the liberal Hadley foreseeabil-
ity test, additionally the Code explicitly imposes a requirement 
that the buyer can only recover those consequential damages 
"which could not reasonably [have been] prevented by cover or 
otherwise."66 Thus, the Code imposes an affirmative duty upon the 
62. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). The concept of reasonable foreseeability was introduced 
into the determination of contractual damages as follows: 
Where two parties have made a contract which one has broken, the damages 
which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should 
be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally ... or 
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both 
parties, at the time they had made the contract, as the probable result of the 
breach of it .... " 
[d. at 151. 
63. The Code Comments acknowledge adoption of the Hadley "reason to know" test and 
rejection of the tacit agreement test. U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 2 (1977). The tacit agreement 
test requires not only that the damages be foreseeable at the time of contracting, but it also 
requires that the defendant expressly or impliedly assent to assume the liability. See E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 875 (1982). 
64. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1977) provides in its entirety: 
[d. 
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of 
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could 
not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and 
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of 
warranty. 
65. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1010 (1964). 
66. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1977), supra note 64. 
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buyer to mitigate damages. 
Case law confirms that a court must address the issue of mitiga-
tion before an aggrieved party may be awarded consequential dam-
ages. For example, in Karlen v. Butler Manufacturing Co.,a7 the 
plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase a weatherproof 
storage unit for storing wheat from the defendant manufacturer. 
Plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer for breach of ex-
press and implied warranties when the wheat spoiled due to mois-
ture and the plaintiff was forced to sell in a low market.a8 Although 
the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, at least 
in part because evidence of the consequential loss was uncertain 
and speculative,a9 the question of the possible mitigating options 
available to the plaintiff was raised. In addressing the question of 
whether the plaintiff's damages could otherwise have reasonably 
been prevented this court quoted Professor Williston on 
mitigation: 
[D]amages which the plaintiff might have avoided with reasonable ef-
fort without undue risk, expense or humiliation are either not caused by 
the defendant's wrong or need not have been, and therefore, are not to 
be charged against him. 
The principle has wide application and frequently involves the estab-
lishment of a standard of reasonable conduct. 
Where inferior goods have been furnished under a contract, the buyer 
cannot recover greater consequential damages caused by using them 
when he knew of their unfitness, than would have been caused by an-
other possible course, although the seller had sold the goods for that pur-
pose. And the principle is general that there can be no recovery for con-
sequences that reasonably could have been avoided.70 
Similarly, in Plastics Molding Corporation v. Park Sherman 
Co.,7l the issue before the court was whether plaintiff was improp-
erly awarded consequential damages because the loss was due to 
plaintiff's decision to accept and use defective goods. Framed in 
V.C.C. terms, the issue before the court was whether plaintiff's 
damages could have been prevented by cover or otherwise.72 The 
67. 526 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1975). 
68. [d. at 1378. 
69. [d. at 1380. 
70. [d. at 1379 (citing 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1353 (Jaeger, 3d ed. 1968». 
71. 606 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1979). 
72. The consequential damages awarded included: 
1) $5,275.68 for increased production costs caused when Park Sherman was 
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Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, after a careful examination of the 
evidence, determined that the plaintiff had not acted unreasonably 
in attempting to salvage usable portions of the defendant's non-
conforming tender.73 The importance of this case is that the court 
of appeals directly considered and determined the reasonableness 
of the plaintiff's actions before affirming an award of consequential 
damages. 
In determining whether a buyer has failed to mitigate loss, the 
question is whether the loss incurred could have reasonably been 
prevented, not whether the buyer's actions constitute a concurring 
proximate cause of the damages.74 The test of proximate causation 
applies to recovery for "injury to person or property proximately 
resulting from any breach of warranty."7~ There is no foreseeability 
requirement. However, when dealing with buyer's economic loss,76 
buyer's damages must be reasonably foreseeable and avoided or 
prevented by cover or otherwise. Case law has confused the issue 
by interchanging these standards.77 Proximate cause language ap-
pears in the concurrence to the instant case;78 the question should 
forced to use hand labor to assemble the usable parts rather than machines; 
2) $18,147.05 for the cost of hand sorting and matching usable lighter tanks and 
bottoms which would not have been incurred had the tanks and bottoms con-
formed to specifications; 
3) $17,783.49 for the purchase of certain substitute parts necessitated by the 
fact that valve openings in the parts supplied by Plastic Moldings were under-
sized; and 
4) $14,447.15 lost on the return of numerous finished lighters to Park Sherman 
by its customers because the lighters were defective. 
[d. at 119-20. 
73. [d. at 120. 
74. Compare the language ofU.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) with § 2-715(2)(b), supra note 64. See 
also, U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 5 (1977). 
75. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (1977). 
76. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1977). 
77. For example, see El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven Co., 199 Neb. 697, 261 
N.W.2d 358 (1978) (lost profits, proximately caused by the seller's breach of warranty, are 
consequential damages) and compare with Bemidji Sales Barn v. Chatfield, 312 Minn. 11, 
250 N.W.2d 185 (1977) (lost profits, provided they are foreseeable by the seller, are recover-
able for breach of warranty) (emphasis added). This problem is somewhat understandable. 
Hypothetically, a buyer's failure to properly inspect goods might have two results. First, a 
court could deny loss of profits on a subsequent contract based upon failure to reasonably 
prevent the loss by inspecting the goods before resale. Additionally, a court could deny re-
covery for injury to person or property, because the failure to inspect was the proximate 
cause of the injury rather than the seller's breach of warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-715 comment 
5 (1977). 
78. 732 F.2d at 1280. 
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be whether the buyer, Chris-Craft, could have reasonably pre-
vented part or all of its recall expenditures. 
Finally, the court of appeals did not address the question of 
whether consequential damages should be awarded where the 
seller's liability would be vastly disproportionate to the purchase 
price of the goods. Recall expenditures of an ultimate manufac-
turer may be within the contemplation of a parts supplier at the 
time of contracting with the manufacturer, subjecting the parts 
supplier to liability for the consequential damages of the recall. 
Professor Bradford Stone has commented extensively on such lia-
bility and whether other factors should be considered by a court in 
determining liability for consequential damages vastly dispropor-
tionate to the purchase price.79 The other factors to be considered 
center on the economic realities of the transaction: compensation, 
bargaining power, and allocation of risk of loss. A recent article 
included an examination of the district court's opinion in the in-
stant case: 
What was apparently bothering the court in this opinion was the per-
ception that buyer, for competitive reasons, unnecessarily cut a corner on 
a safety-related item to save ten dollars and then wanted seller to pay for 
the whole loss. The court reasoned: 
As between the two parties, Chris-Craft was in a stronger bar-
gaining position and opted for production of an untried and 
cheaper tank, a risk which they now seek to transfer in toto to 
Taylor & Gaskin although they did not make Taylor & Gaskin 
aware of their particular requirements for use of the tank.sO 
The consequential damage provision of the V.C.C. does not eval-
uate the disproportionality of the damages. Thus, case law indi-
cates that a buyer should recover the full amount of foreseeable 
consequential damages regardless of the disproportionate relation-
ship between such damages and the purchase price.81 A new sec-
79. B. STONE, PRODUCT RECALL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES: EFFECTS OF THE NATIONAL 
TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY ACT (1971). This indepth report, published by the Bu-
reau of Business Research, Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of 
Michigan, was referred to by Judge Boyle in the district court opinion in the instant case. 
80. B. Stone, Recovery of Consequential Damages for Product Recall Expenditures, 
1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 485, 529 (emphasis supplied). 
81. See for example, Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971); Ford Motor 
Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176,465 S.W.2d 80 (1971). Consequential damages for recall expenses 
have previously been allowed in Upjohn Co. v. Rachelle Laboratories 661 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 
1981). However, the direct expenses of the recall awarded, $182,858.19, appear insignificant 
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tion in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts may ultimately im-
pact upon this type of recovery. Section 351(3) provides: "A court 
may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for 
loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reli-
ance, or otherwise if it concludes that in the circumstances justice 
so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation."82 
The comments to this section indicate that the dis proportionality 
of the damages to the purchase price should be considered by the 
court. "The fact that the price is relatively small suggests that it 
was not intended to cover the risk of such liability."8s Minimally, 
this new section should cause reflection in an era of million dollar 
damage awards. 
III. OPTION CONTRACTS 
The third case being surveyed does not involve extremely com-
plicated contract law principles, nor does it represent a change or 
shift in the law; rather it serves as a basic refresher on option con-
tracts. In Eaton Corporation v. Easton Associates, Inc.,8" the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with an appeal from a 
summary judgment dismissing both a specific performance con-
tract claim and a damages claim sounding in tort. The facts are 
complicated because of numerous communications between the 
parties and their attorneys; accordingly, the following statement is 
abbreviated. 
Eaton Corporation owned a five acre parcel in Farmington Hills, 
which was subject to a repurchase right held by the original own-
ers. The repurchase right was to be triggered by Eaton's failure to 
effectuate substantial construction on the property within two 
years of the sale. Eaton, apparently anxious to sell the property, 
tried to force the original owners into exercising their repurchase 
rights or waiving them.8& The original owners refused to do either; 
nevertheless, Eaton entered into an option contract88 with Sloan 
in comparison to the total contract breach judgment of $3,446,059.19. 
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1979). 
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 comment f .(1979). 
84. 728 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1984). 
85. Id. at 287. 
86. An option contract is an irrevocable offer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 
(1979) provides: "An option contract is a promise which meets the requirements for the 
formation of a contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer." Id. Such irrevo-
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for the purchase of the five acres. The option contract required 
that $10,000 be deposited into escrow as consideration for the op-
tion to be held open for 150 days.87 In order to exercise the option, 
Sloan was required to tend $30,000 within the 150-day period.88 
Shortly thereafter Sloan discovered that the prior owners had 
repurchase rights.89 Under the terms of the option contract, seller 
Eaton was to provide buyer Sloan with an owner's title commit-
ment90 and Sloan had fifteen days to object in writing to any title 
deficiency.91 Failure of the seller to remedy such, defect within 
twenty days gave the buyer the right to "proceed with this Agree-
ment (in which event, the warranty deed to the property will be 
delivered subject to any title defects) or to cancel this Option 
cable offers under seal were called options. Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N.C. 622, 97 S.E. 654 
(1918). 
87. 728 F.2d at 287. 
88. [d. Paragraph 2.3(b) of the option contract provided: 
[d. 
At the time of exercise of the Option, Seller shall deliver to Escrow Agent a de-
posit of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,OOO.OO)(the "Deposit"), to be applied 
against the purchase price and Escrow Agent shall deliver a portion of the Option 
Payment to Seller and a portion of the Option Payment to Purchaser as indicated 
in the schedule set forth in Section 2.3(c) below. Should Purchaser exercise the 
Option at any time after 120 days from the date hereof, the entire Option Pay-
ment shall be paid to Seller. 
89. Although there was some dispute as to how Sloan obtained the knowledge, Sloan had 
constructive, if not actual, knowledge, through his attorney. [d. at 288. 
90. Paragraph 4.1 required that Eaton would provide Sloan with an owner's title insur-
ance agreement within 15 days of the option agreement. [d. 
91. Paragraph 4.2 provided: 
If objection is made by written notice from Purchaser to Seller that title is not in 
the condition required within fifteen (15) days after receipt of such commitment 
by Purchaser, Seller shall have twenty (20) days from the time it is notified in 
writing of the particular defects claimed to remedy the title or to obtain endorse-
ments to the title insurance commitment which guarantee that Lawyers Title shall 
insure against such defects. If Seller is unable to remedy the title or obtain the 
endorsements within said twenty (20) day period, Purchaser shall have the option 
to proceed with this Agreement (in which event, the warranty deed to the prop-
erty will be delivered subject to any such title defects) or to cancel this Option 
Agreement and receive back from Seller the Option Payment. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, should any liens or encumbrances upon the Property appear which 
arose because of any action or failure to act on the part of Seller, then Purchaser 
shall have the right to apply that portion of the purchase price as may be required 
to discharge any such liens and/or encumbrances and to deduct the amount 
thereof from the purchase price, or to take title subject to such defects. 
[d. at 289. 
HeinOnline -- 1985 Det. C.L. Rev. 470 1985
470 Detroit College of Law Review [2:453 
Agreement and receive back from Seller the Option Payment."92 
Sloan did not cancel the option because of the title defect but 
instead paid an additional $2,500 into escrow to extend the option 
period.93 Furthermore, Sloan never exercised the option. Instead, 
on the last day of the extended option period he demanded that 
Eaton remedy the title defect, and advised Eaton that he was in 
breach of the option agreement and, accordingly, the option would 
remain in effect until the title was cured.94 Eaton filed this diver-
sity action to recover the escrowed option premiums and Sloan 
counterclaimed seeking specific performance of the option contract 
and damages for alleged fraud and misrepresentation. Eaton then 
sold the property to Manufacturers Hanover Mortgage Corpora-
tion, which took with full knowledge of the original owners' repur-
chase rights.911 
The court of appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's summary 
j~dgment that Sloan was not entitled to damages or specific per-
formance under the option contract. Even though Eaton was una-
ble to deliver title, Eaton was not in breach of the option contract. 
The option contract provided the remedy in the case of a title de-
fect, giving the buyer an alternative and relieving the seller from 
liability for contract breach.96 More importantly, Sloan never ac-
quired any rights in the property because he failed to timely exer-
cise the option. The option contract, after all, is not a contract to 
purchase land, but merely an offer, irrevocable for a specified pe-
riod of time because supported by consideration. "An option is but 
an offer, strict compliance with the terms of which is required; ac-
ceptance must be in compliance with the terms proposed by· the 
option both as to the exact thing offered and within the time speci-
fied; otherwise the right is lost. "97 
Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopted the 
term "option contract" to replace the common law term "option," 
a party's ability to sue for specific performance of the proposed 
92. See paragraph 4.2, supra note 91. 
93. Additionally, Sloan claimed that he incurred $50,000 worth of expenses in prepara-
tion for construction on the property during this option period. 728 F.2d at 289. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 290. 
96. See paragraph 4.2 of the option contract, supra note 91. 
97. Bailey v. Grover, 237 Mich. 548, 554 (1927). 
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contract is not altered.9s The long standing majority rule, through-
out the country and in Michigan, is that the option holder must 
exercise the option in order to have rights pursuant to the underly-
ing contract.99 Furthermore, time is of the essence in exercising an 
option right,IOO so much so that the mailbox rule does not apply. 
While acceptance of a revocable offer is valid upon dispatch, the 
weight of authority holds that acceptance of an irrevocable offer, 
i.e. exercise of an option, is only valid upon receipt.101 Sloan's mis-
take was that he never tendered the $30,000 necessary to exercise 
the option during the option period. 
Sloan also counterclaimed for damages on a fraud theory. The 
district court granted a summary judgment on this count holding 
that in order for Sloan to have a claim for fraud he would have to 
have exercised the option. l02 The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded. While it is true that fraud and misrepresentation are con-
tract defenses and the bases for damage claims on a breach of con-
tract action, it is not necessary for a defendant to be in privity of 
contract or a party to the transaction to be liable for fraud. l08 In 
order to sustain a tort action for common law fraud the plaintiff 
must establish: 
1) there was a material representation by defendant that was false; 2) the 
defendant knew that it was false when he made it or made it recklessly 
without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; 3) the 
defendant made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by 
plaintiff; 4) plaintiff acted upon it and 5) thereby suffered injury for 
which he sues!04 
98. See supra, note 86. The REsTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONTRAcrs § 46 (1932) did not use 
option language to define an irrevocable offer: 
Id. 
An offer for which such consideration has been given or received as is necessary to 
make a promise binding, or which is in such form as to make a promise in the 
offer binding irrespective of consideration, cannot be terminated during the time 
fixed in the offer itself or, if no time is fixed, within a reasonable time, either by 
revocation or by the offeror's death or insanity. 
99. Muirhead v. Friemann, 270 Mich. 181, 258 N.W. 238 (1935); Gurunian v. Grossman, 
331 Mich. 412, 49 N.W.2d 354 (1951). 
100. Wesley v. United States, 384 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1967). 
101. See 1A CORBIN, CONTRAcrs § 264 (1963) and the cases cited therein. See also, RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 68 (1979). 
102. 728 F.2d at 291. 
103. Butler v. Watkins, 80 U.S. 456 (13 Wall. 1872). 
104. Michael v. Jones, 333 Mich. 476, 53 N.W.2d 342 (1952); Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 398 Mich. 330, 247 N.W.2d 813 (1976). 
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The court of appeals held that depending upon the facts estab-
lished at trial, Sloan might be entitled to a refund of the $12,500 
consideration paid for the option and damages for his expenditures 
in preparation to build on the five acre parce1.105 The case was ap-
propriately remanded to give Sloan an opportunity to establish the 
alleged misrepresentation of Eaton. 
105. 728 F.2d at 292. 
